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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the determinants of gearing of 558 Chinese listed 
companies between 2007 and 2012. The Least Square Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) model is employed to investigate the influence of related variables on 
gearing.  Explanatory variables include: profitability, size, growth 
opportunity, tangibility, liquidity, non-debt tax shield, percentage of tradable 
shares, proportion of top ten share- holders holding, tax rate and uniqueness 
while controlling for firm factors and industry effects. Two measures are used 
to measure gearing: total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio.  Our results have 
interesting implications for corporate capital structure on other fast developing 
nations as well. 
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1 - Introduction  
 
In a fast developing country like China, the financing requirement for 
corporates’ growth is large. Decisions regarding gearing and capital structure 
are crucial to the smooth running of operations, the avoidance of insolvency 
and the long-term sustainability of the business. 
Modern studies, recognising the importance of capital structure 
decisions began with MM theory, a theory first proposed in 1958 by 
Modigliani and Miller in 1958, which asserted that a company’s capital 
structure is unrelated to its value. Subsequently, finance theorists and 
economists relaxed their hypothesis of the perfect market in MM theory, and 
developed several theoretical models by studying companies’ capital 
structure from different perspectives, including the Miller model, the Static 
Trade-off model and the Dynamic Trade-off model etc.  With the 
development of economic theories, information economics, industrial 
organization, corporate organization and risk management etc., a large 
number of schools of thought regarding capital structure subsequently 
emerged, such as the Signaling theory proposed by Ross (1977), the Pecking 
Order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and Control Rights, proposed by 
Harris and Raviv (1991).  However, the core question of what the 
determinants of companies’ capital structure are has not reached a consensus 
amongst theorists (Myers, 2001). 
Based on theoretical analysis, numerous scholars have carried out 
empirical research from diverse perspectives (national, industry, firms’ 
financial indicators and agency theory), largely focusing on the determinants 
and the impact of the choice of capital structure on a company’s value. One 
such early study into the determinants of capital structure that drew clear 
conclusions was carried out by Marsh (1982), who found that the choice of a 
company’s financing is affected by the market and history. The study found 
that companies have a clear explicit target gearing ratio which has a 
functional relationship with size, bankruptcy risks as well as the asset 
structure. Another seminal study was by Titman and Wessels (1988) who 
proposed a theoretical and empirical framework  of eight indicators that  
affect capital structure: non-debt tax  shields, profitability, assets structure, 
growth, size, uniqueness,  volatility and industry. Subsequently, increasing 
numbers of scholars began to study the determinants of capital structure at the 
company level. Following Harris and Raviv’s (1991) investigation, further 
studies were carried out into the determinants of the capital structure of US 
listed companies, with some beginning to compare the determinants of capital 
structure in different countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that listed 
companies’ financial leverage decisions in developed countries were similar 
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to those of in US companies. The listed companies’ debt ratios in Japan,  
Germany, France,  Italy,  the UK  and Canada etc. are positively related to 
tangibility and size (apart from Germany), but negatively related to 
investment opportunities (Tobin  Q)  and profitability. By contrast, Wald 
(1999) stressed the differences in the financial leverage decisions of G7-listed 
companies based on their legal and institutional structure and bankruptcy 
codes. 
This controversy about the applicability of a global theory of capital 
structure prompted scholars to empirically investigate gearing decisions in 
emerging countries as well.  For example, Booth et al. (2001) studied ten 
developing countries (including Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Malaysia, Jordan, 
India, Thai, Pakistan, Turkey and Zimbabwe), and found that the 
determinants of developing countries’ capital structure were similar to those 
of developed countries and their macroeconomic factors. A recent study by 
Foster and Young (2013) focused on ten emerging markets from Asia and 
Latin America. They found that the determinants of emerging markets 
companies are similar to those in developed markets; however, different 
effects of determinants apply on companies in different regions, and the 
relationships in the Asian sample are more consistent with theories than those 
in Latin America. 
However, relatively few studies on capital structure determinants 
have focused on Chinese listed companies, besides those of Chen (2004), 
Chen and Strange (2005), Huang and Song (2006), Bhabra et al.  (2008), 
Qian et al. (2009), as well as Yang and Ma (2011) etc. whose sample data 
was collected before the end of 2007. This was the year that non-tradable 
share reform in China had almost come to fruition following its introduction 
in 2005 (CSRC) and thus any study post 2007 merits investigation in its own 
right. 
This paper focuses on the determinants of Chinese listed companies’ 
capital structure, and explores the specific features of companies’ financing 
preferences, using the latest company databases from 2007-2012. 
Specifically, this paper focuses on answering the following questions: (i) Are 
there any changes in the effects of the factors on Chinese listed companies’ 
capital structure when compared with previous studies of Chinese listed 
companies?  (ii) Are the impacts of the factors on the capital structure of 
western countries similar to those on the capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies? (iii) Do listed companies in China have the same financing 
preferences as listed companies in other countries (Pecking order theory)? 
Our contribution is dual: Firstly, we provide a recent update of the 
literature on capital structure; and secondly, we also provide a lens into the 
changing capital structure decisions of the largest emerging market of the 
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world.  The latter will allow us to generalise how financial decisions, 
emerging market development and globalization are interconnected and may 
provide a point of comparison to the temporal change in financing and 
development of other emerging nations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A theoretical review 
and summaries of previous empirical studies will be presented in Section 2, 
which begins with a discussion of MM theorem and theories of capital 
structure, along with comparisons of the various findings of previous studies. 
Section 3 introduces the current situation of both the capital market in China 
and Chinese listed companies, in preparation for the forthcoming research 
into Chinese listed companies’ capital structure.  Section 4 discusses the data.  
In section 5, methodology is depicted where the variables are defined and the 
regression model employed as well as the approaches aimed at addressing the 
research questions are presented. Section 6 discusses the results and the 
research questions in relation to the findings of previous studies to evaluate 
the impacts of each explanatory variable. Section 7 presents a summary of the 
empirical findings and discusses the wider implications. 
 
 
2 - Literature review 
 
This section reviews literature on capital structure, and is divided into 
2 parts. The first part presents the theories related to capital structure, and the 
second part discusses the main determinants of capital structure. 
 
2.1 -  Theories of capital structure 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the MM theorem, a theory 
which gave rise to modern capital structure theory.  This theory is not only 
considered to be the earliest, most fully elaborated theory of corporate capital 
structure, but is also recognized as a classical theory in capital structure 
research. Modigliani and Miller (1963) improved their theory by adding tax 
to the other assumptions. Miller (1977) proposed the so-called Miller model 
that considers both corporate income tax and personal income tax to estimate 
the effect of capital structure on corporate value. The present section reviews 
literature of the trade-off theory, pecking order theory and agency cost. 
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2.1.1 – Trade off theory 
 
The Trade-off theory emphasizes the achievement of an optimal 
capital structure when maximizing the firm’s value, based on the balance of 
the debt tax shield and the cost of financial distress.  The company tracks the 
trade-off theory to set an expected debt-to-value ratio and gradually moves 
closer to the goal that is the balance of the debt tax shield and bankruptcy 
costs (Myers, 1984; Frank and Goyal, 2008).   This provoked aspects of 
arguments which included the target being possibly derived from imputed 
evidence, the tax effect, bankruptcy costs and transaction costs (Frank and 
Goyal, 2008). Hence, Myers’s definition should be divided into two parts:  
the static trade-off and dynamic trade-off (Frank and Goyal, 2008). After 
taking the corporate income tax into account, it generated the advantage of 
debt and offered a tax shield effect to profits after taking into account 
corporate tax (Javed Iqbal et al., 2012). 
 
2.1.2 - Static trade-off theory 
 
After the MM theorem and the Miller model were introduced, many 
scholars attempted to make the Miller model consistent with the Equilibrium 
theory of optimal capital structure, including DeAngelo and Masulis (1980).  
Bradley et al (1984), on the basis of such investigations, built a single period 
model of optimal capital structure, integrating such research methods and 
perspectives. A related investigation by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
provides a meaning to the experience of the Static Trade-off theory: 
Static Trade-off theory forecasts the actual leverage follows the target or 
optimal leverage (optimal debt level), and predicts the cross-sectional 
correlation between the average leverage and assets risk, profitability, tax 
status and assets type.   Frank and Goyal (2008), think highly of this 
contribution, pointing out that Bradley et al (1984) provided standard 
expressions on the Static Trade-off theory. Moreover, the Static Trade-off 
model provides a solution to leverage without discussing mean reversion, 
which implies it does not cover any conception of target adjustment (Frank 
and Goyal, 2008). 
 
2.1.2 - Dynamic trade-off theory 
 
Kane et al (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1984) provide the 
initial two dynamic models that consider tax saving versus bankruptcy cost 
trade-off, with both analyzing continuous period models with uncertainty, tax 
Dimitrios I. Vortelinos, Geeta Lakshmi, Lin Ya –  Gearing of Chinese Listed Companies – 
Frontiers in Finance and Economics – Vol 12 N°2, 57-97 
 
62 
 
and bankruptcy cost without considering the influence of transaction cost. 
Leland (1994) constructed the model of Enclosing Solutions of dynamic 
capital structure with assumptions of time-independence and the level of 
endogenous bankruptcy, pointing out the agency cost of asset replacement 
precisely exists and is far less than the debt tax shield effect.  Although the 
agency cost reduces the debt ratio, the risk premiums will increase, while the 
lower the agency cost the greater the hedging benefits (Leland, 1998). 
Assuming that market timing does not exist, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) found that companies with a higher historical market-to-book ratio 
tend to choose external equity to avoid financial distress, which also verifies 
the relationship between the current leverage and historical market-to-book 
ratio.   Hennessy and Whited (2005) constructed a model with an endogenous 
dividend policy, leverage and real investment to build a dynamic model based 
on income taxes resulting from financing, financial distress and equity 
flotation costs, as well as the effects from the interaction of these three 
presences. In their view, optimal capital structure is path-dependent.  Kayhan 
and Titman (2007) deconstructed the market timing variables proposed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2002), distinguishing between short-term (one year) and 
long-term (five-year) effects of market timing.  Their results indicate that 
changes in stock price will influence leverage, but the effect will gradually be 
reversed after continuing over a period of time. This suggests the company’s 
history has a significant impact on its leverage, and that the capital structure 
will move towards the expected optimal target in the long term.  Mahajan and 
Tartaroglu (2008), based on the hypothesis of equity market timing, produced 
a study on the relationship between historical market-to-book ratios and the 
corporate leverage of G7 countries. The empirical results show that leverage 
is negatively correlated to the historical market-to-book ratio, but the 
influence from equity market timing on leverage does not persist, which is 
consistent with the Dynamic Balance theory. Frank and Goyal (2008) provide 
a general description of Dynamic Trade-off models as being whatever the 
optimal structure of next period is (raising funds or making payment, equity 
financing or debt financing), with current optimal financing decision 
depending on the predicted optimal capital structure of the next period. 
Results will be different because of different costs emphasized by different 
models. 
Faulkender et al. (2012) studied the influence of transaction costs on 
the adjustment of a company’s leverage, showing that the characteristics of a 
company’s cash flow affect the company’s leverage target and the adjustment 
speed towards this target.   In recent times, several empirical studies on 
capital structure via Trade-Off theory have been conducted. Ghazouani’s 
(2013) study on the capital structure with a sample of 20 Tunisian firms’ 
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capital structure between 2004 and 2010 via trade-off theory tested static and 
dynamic models encompassing the variable of transaction costs.  The results 
indicate that, for the static model, profitability and assets structure are the 
main determinants of Tunisian companies’ leverage. Adding the 
consideration of particular fixed effects helps to enhance the explanation of 
the static Trade-off theory. For the dynamic model, the speed of adjustment 
towards the target is slow, and the transaction costs for Tunisian companies 
are relatively very high. 
 
2.2 – Pecking order theory 
 
Myers (1984) proposed the Pecking Order theory, which challenges 
the interpretation of the Static Trade- off theory.  Myers and Majluf (1984) 
show that when companies issue shares because of information asymmetry.  
This may be considered to be a negative sign that managers are willing to 
finance with equity when they tend to believe the stock is overvalued. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested the Pecking Order theory and Static 
Trade-off theory. Taking into account the default, risk-free companies are 
less affected by asymmetric information, they selected 157 large, investment 
grade companies between 1971 and 1989 as a sample. Their results support 
the Pecking Order theory, in which there is no optimal leverage. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) analyzed the financing of all United States 
listed companies between 1971 and 1998 to test the Pecking Order theory. 
They doubted the broad applicability of this theory, and found companies 
facing severe, adverse selection that are considered as companies with highly 
asymmetric information, did not show a stronger tendency of the Pecking 
Order. Ni and Yu (2008), in their study that tested the Pecking Order theory, 
argue that there is no evidence that Chinese companies follow the Pecking 
Order theory in their sample of 407 Chinese listed companies in 2004. 
Further subsection analysis indicates that large companies follow Pecking 
Order theory but small and medium-sized companies do not, which goes 
against the implications of Pecking Order theory. Qureshi (2009) studied the 
explanatory power of the Pecking Order theory in Pakistan, using 34 years’ 
worth of balance sheet data between 1972 and 2005. His results indicate that 
leverage is negatively significant to current and past profitability, but 
positively significant to dividends, which offers strong support to the Pecking 
Order theory as regards profitability and dividends. 
De Jong  et al.   (2011) examine the Static  Trade-off theory versus 
Pecking Order theory for US companies,  focusing on a main disparity in 
notional prediction. Dutta (2013) investigated the Pecking Order theory in 
652 Indian companies between 2002 and 2010.  However, the results reject 
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the Pecking Order theory, which is consistent with previous studies on 
India, such as those of Singh (1995), Mahakud (2006), and Singh and 
Kumar (2012).  This suggests that Indian companies do not use the Pecking 
Order theory when making capital decisions. 
 
2.2.1 – Agency cost 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) conducted a pioneering study on agency 
theory, distinguishing between two kinds of conflicts. One is the conflict 
between shareholders and managers (equity agency cost) because managers 
are not the owners of the enterprise; and, second is the conflict between debt 
holders and shareholders (debt equity costs).  They argued that an increase in 
the proportion of debt financing will reduce the equity agency cost, but raise 
the debt agency cost. When these two are equal, the corporate agency costs 
reach their minimum and its value reaches the maximum which is the point of 
optimal capital structure. 
Lee et al. (2008) argued that high wage dispersion (including 
managerial equity compensation shares) can alleviate the agency problems 
and eventually develop the company’s performance.  Fauzi and Locke (2012) 
explored the relationship between agency cost, ownership structure and the 
corporate governance mechanisms of 79 New Zealand listed companies.  
Their results indicate that managerial ownership, the number of board 
members and the nomination and remuneration committee significantly 
influence the diminishing of the agency cost. This implies that corporate 
governance mechanisms and ownership structures are crucial in alleviating 
the agency cost of the New Zealand listed companies. 
Zhang (2013) analyzed the influence of the capital structure of 775 
Chinese listed companies between 2010 and 2012 based on their agency cost. 
Their results indicated that agency cost is slightly negatively related to the 
debt-asset ratio, and has a positively insignificant correlation to long-term 
liability. Mo- hammed (2013) tested the correlation between the agency cost 
and capital structure of Nigeria listed companies from 2000 to 2006 using a 
dynamic panel model.  His study showed that  the relationship between the 
capital structure and agency costs is inverse, which is in accordance with 
Jensen’s (1986) theory that debt can cut the agency cost of free cash flow by 
cutting the cash flow supplied to man- agers. Nayeri and Salehi (2013) 
studied the relationship between competition and the agency cost of 67 
Iranian listed companies from 2006 to 2011.  They found that competition is 
negatively significant to audit fees, which explains the variability of agency 
cost.  They proposed considering competition as a monitoring tool, which is 
in accordance with shareholders’ interest; the agency costs will be zero if there is no monitoring cost. 
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2.3 – Review of the determinants of capital structure 
 
The present paper concentrates on Pecking order theory and agency 
cost and studies the determinants of capital structure. Determinants are 
profitability, frm size, growth opportunity, asset structure, non-debt tax 
shield, tax, ownership structure and ownership concentration, among others. 
The present subsection presents the detailed impact of each factor on a 
company’s capital structure. 
 
2.3.1 - Profitability 
 
Companies with high profitability will take on more internal 
financing, illustrating that the profitability and debt levels have a negative 
relationship (Myers and Majfuf, 1984). The majority of empirical research 
supports the results of Myers and Majtuf (1984), including the studies of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), and the studies of Chinese listed 
companies by Chen (2004) and Huang and Song (2005), among others.  Chen 
and Strange (2005) showed that profitability is a highly negatively significant 
to capital structure in their study of Chinese listed companies’ capital 
structure, using a sample of 972 listed companies in 2003. 
Alom (2013) confirmed this in his study of Bangladeshi firms’ 
capital structure with a sample of 44 listed companies between 2004 - 2011; 
he found that profitability is negatively significant to leverage, which is in 
accordance with the results of Claudiu (2013) and Bayrakdaroğlu et al.  
(2013).  Foster and Young (2013) focused on 10 countries from emerging 
markets, including India, Indonesia, Korea (Rep), Malaysia, Thailand, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, encompassing more than 1000 
firms between 1999 and 2000 in the sample. Their study indicated that 
leverage has a significant and negative correlation with Profitability yields, 
regardless of debt measure, for Asian firms, and leverage is negative but 
insignificant for Latin American firms. 
 
2.3.2 – Size 
 
This is the capacity that companies can take advantage of in terms of 
resources and cash flow, which is generally referred to as total assets, total 
equity or prime operating revenue. Most studies suggest that size is positively 
correlated to a company’s leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995), in their study 
of G7 countries’ capital structure, argued that it is easier for large companies 
to take diversified strategies to gain a more stable cash flow. Booth et al.  
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(2001), found that the relationship of size to leverage is positively and highly 
significant for many of the 10 developing countries that they studied. 
Degryse et al. (2012) analyzed the capital structure of Dutch SMEs with the 
help of a static panel data regression model, and found the correlation of size 
and long-term debt to be significantly positive and economically relevant. 
However, studies on the capital structure of Chinese listed companies 
produce different results due to the different dependent variables employed.  
Chen (2004) sets dependent variables such as book value leverage, and found 
that the relationship of size to total debt is positive but not significant, with 
size being negatively and highly significant to long-term debt.  Contrastingly, 
Chen & Strange (2005) utilised dependent variables such as the total debt 
ratio of book value and the total debt ratio of market value; they argued that 
size is positively related only to the market value debt ratio.  Huang and Song 
(2005) found a positive relationship between size and leverage. Alom (2013) 
found there is no significant relationship between the size and capital 
structure of Bangladeshi companies. 
 
2.3.3 – Growth opportunity 
 
Theoretical studies, like Myers (1977), indicated that there is a 
negative correlation between the growth and leverage of a company. As 
regards companies with low-growth or fewer investment opportunities, 
Jensen (1986) argued that debt financing plays a role that lowers the agency 
cost caused by limiting the managers’ right of disposal. From the perspective 
of empirical results, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Moh’d et al. (1998), Wald 
(1999), Črnigoj and Mramor (2009), Degryse et al. (2012) found that the 
correlation of growth to leverage is negative. 
Furthermore, in a study of Indian companies’ capital structure, 
Bhaduri (2002) found there is positive correlation between growth 
opportunity and the debt ratio. In studies focusing on China, Chen (2004), 
and Chen & Strange (2005) found no relationship between the rate of growth 
and capital structure. However, Huang and Song (2006), using a sample of 
1,200 Chinese-listed companies from 1994 to 2003 document the 
determinants of Chinese companies’ capital structure, and found that 
companies with higher growth opportunities tend to lower leverage. 
Noulas and Genimakis (2011) probe the determinants of Greek listed 
companies’ capital structure using a sample of 259 firms between 1998 and 
2006.  They found a significant positive correlation with leverage and 
growth. Bayrakdaroğlu et al.  (2013) analyzed the capital structure of Turkish 
companies using a sample of 242 firms from 2000 to 2009. They found a 
significant positive correlation with leverage and growth, consistent with the 
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foundings of Noulas and Genimakis (2011).  Foster and Young (2013) show 
that growth constitutes an insignificant coefficient for leverage in both Asian 
and Latin American companies. 
 
2.3.4 – Asset structure 
 
When a company declares it is bankrupt, it will lose its intangible 
assets. Thus, to maintain their own benefits, the debt holder will require 
companies to provide certain tangible assets as collateral in order to reduce 
the information asymmetry caused by moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Companies with higher tangibility can acquire loan funds more easily.  There 
is a positive coefficient of tangibility to leverage, which has been confirmed 
by Harris and Raviv (1991), Chen (2004), Huang and Song (2006), Qiu and 
La (2010), and Noulas and Genimakis (2011). 
However, Črnigoj and Mramor (2009), in their study of Slovenian 
companies’ capital structure, pro- vided empirical evidence that tangibility is 
negative to leverage. Degryse et al. (2012) found a positive correlation of 
collateral to leverage and intangible assets to leverage in Dutch companies. 
Saarani and Shah opportunityadan (2013) also found a positive relationship 
between the long-term debt ratio and tangibility, with a negative relationship 
between the short-term debt ratio and tangibility. 
 
2.3.5 – Non-debt tax shield effects 
 
This is usually measured by depreciation  / total assets. After reviewing 
the effects of corporate income tax, personal income tax and non-debt tax 
shields, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argued that non-debt tax shields 
including depreciation, investment tax incentives and deferred tax losses can 
be used as an effective alternative to the tax benefits of debt financing. 
Bradley et al.  (1984) using the sum of depreciation and tax incentives 
divided by profits before tax and interest proxy as a non-debt tax shield found 
a negative relationship with leverage, which is consistent with the results of 
Wald (1999),  and Huang and Song (2006). 
However Degryse et al.  (2012) found that depreciation is positively 
significant to short-term debt, and has a negative relationship with long-term 
debt, although there is no significance for total debt. In addition, 
Bayrakdaroğlu et al. (2013), in their study on a sample of 242 Turkish 
companies from 2000 to 2009, revealed a significant and positive correlation 
of depreciation to leverage, which is consistent with the findings of Noulas 
and Genimakis (2011). 
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2.3.6 - Tax 
 
According to the analysis of Miller and Modigliani (1966), the 
relationship of corporate value to leverage is positive. As the interest of debt 
has a tax shield effect, the higher the tax rate, the bigger profits gained via 
offsetting by a tax shield, thus the company tends to debt financing (higher 
leverage). Although most of researchers believe tax has an important impact 
on firms’ capital structure, many empirical studies find no significant 
relationship between tax and capital structure, including Foster and Young 
(2013). MacKie-Mason (1990) explained that gearing ratios are the 
accumulative outcome of years of distinct decisions, and most tax shields 
have a tiny impact on the marginal tax rate for most companies. 
Huang and Song (2006) found tax negatively affects long-term 
financing, while Chen & Strange (2005) found no significant correlation of 
tax to leverage. Degryse et al. (2012), in their study of capital structure in the 
Netherlands between 2002 and 2005, found that tax is negatively significant 
to capital structure.  Zare et al.  (2013), in their study of 259 Iranian 
companies from 1998 to 2006, indicated a positive and significant correlation 
of tax to capital structure, which is consistent with the results of Eldomiaty 
(2007), who studied the capital structure of 99 Egyptian companies in 2004. 
 
2.3.7 – Onwnership structure 
 
Currently, most studies on the influence of ownership structure on 
capital structure focus on the impact of management ownership on capital 
structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) believe the interest conflict between 
management and shareholders will result in management taking a suboptimal 
investment at the expense of the shareholders’ interests in order to pursue 
their own welfare improvement.  Thus, this study on the Chinese ownership 
structure will mainly focus on the proportion of tradable shares and 
ownership concentration. 
 
2.3.8 - Uniqueness 
 
Company uniqueness can also be understood as an asset of the 
company. Bradley et al. (1984) suggested that the sum of annual adverting 
and research and development expense to annual net sales of the same period 
over 10 years is significant and negative to firm leverage.  In their study of 
capital structure, Titman and Wessels (1988) found that if the company’s 
products are highly original and it is difficult to find alternative products and 
corresponding technology in the market, employees, then suppliers and 
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customers face higher costs when the company is in bankruptcy/liquidation.  
Bhaduri (2002) in a study of Indian companies’ capital structure applied 
R&D expense accounting for sales revenues and the proportion of selling 
expense occupying sales revenues to measure this characteristic. 
From the above, we infer that relatively little recent has focused on 
China. The next section explains the development of the Chinese capital 
market. 
 
 
3 – Chinese listed companies 
 
The emergence of two capital markets, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in Mainland China in the 
early 1990s marked the rapid development of the Chinese stock market.  
There were 2,342 companies listed in these two exchanges on December 
31st, 2011.  In the Chinese stock market, there are:  (i) shares issued by 
domestic companies for domestic investors (denominated as ’A’ shares); (ii) 
shares issued by companies that are registered and listed in mainland China 
for overseas investors and domestic individual investors (’B’ shares); and (iii) 
shares registered in mainland China and listed in Hong Kong (’C’ shares). 
After decades of development, the Chinese stock market has 
experienced a severe equity division, with an unbalanced distribution of the 
same shares with different rights and with different benefits. Chen (2013) 
describes and analyses the capital market evolution in China in more detail. It 
is important to grasp the notion of the financing structure, which includes 
internal financing and external financing, before understanding the capital 
structure of listed companies. While internal financing is the process of 
turning retained earnings and depreciations into investment, external 
financing is the process whereby companies finance from outside sources, 
comprising of equity financing and debt financing. According to the Pecking 
Order theory, the cost of internal financing is generally lower than that of 
external financing. Thus, compared with external financing, companies prefer 
internal financing, and moreover they prefer debt financing to equity 
financing. However, China’s listed companies perform differently in terms of 
financing preferences. 
The data from 2011 published by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) indicates that, omitting government bonds and policy 
financial bonds, the growth of direct financing has been relatively slow. 
Funds raised from the stock market accounts for 20%, indicating a decline 
compared to 2010.   The total balance of loans was RMB 56 trillion, with a 
total market value of shares and the balance of corporate bonds of RMB 26 
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trillion.  The Banking sector occupied 92% of the assets of financial 
institutions, while insurance and securities and funds industries only 
accounted for about 8%. The imbalance in financing structure indicates the 
riskiness of the Chinese financial system concentrating overly on the banking 
system. This is not conducive to the efficient allocation of financial resources 
and the stability of the financial system, and limits companies’ financing 
options. 
Table 1 shows the equity structure of Chinese listed companies from 
2001 to 2011.  Non-tradable shares occupy over 60% of the total 
capitalization before 2007. The equity structures of listed companies were 
extremely illiquid, while shareholders with non-tradable shares largely 
controlled the companies. In addition, among non-tradable shares, state-
owned shares and state-owned legal individual’s shares constitute the largest 
component, while the percentage of staff shares in non-tradable shares can be 
considered as 0. 
 
Table 1 
 
Year TC TS NTS SOS SS 
2001 5,218 1,813 35% 3,400 65% 2,411 71% 24 1% 
2002 5,875 2,037 35% 3,830 65% 2,773 72% 16 0% 
2003 6,428 2,268 35% 4,161 65% 3,047 73% 11 0% 
2004 7,149 2,577 36% 4,572 64% 3,344 73% 9 0% 
2005 7,630 2,915 38% 4,745 62% 3,433 72% 4 0% 
2006 14,926 5,638 38% 9,309 62% 45,588 49% 2 0% 
2007 22,470 10,331 46% 12,138 54% 6,034 50% 1 0% 
2008 24,323 24,189 99% 134 1% 75 56% 1 0% 
2009 20,650 20,542 99% 107 1% 62 58% 0 0% 
2010 27,056 26,960 100% 96 0% 61 64% 0 0% 
2011 29,769,893 2,968,051 100% 8,843 0% 5,856 66% 0 0% 
 
Notes. Table 1 reports values of parameters regarding the equity structure of 
Chinese listed companies. Tradable shares (TS) indicates the number of shares 
available to be traded in an open market. Non-tradable shares  (NTS) indicates 
the number of shares non-available to stock market participants. Stated-owned 
shares (SOS) is the number of shares owned by the state. Staff shares (SS) is 
the shares owned by the staff of companies. Source: China Securities and 
Futures Statistical Yearbook 2008-2012. TC refers to Total Capitalization. 
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The reform of non-tradable shares began when the related regulation 
came into force in 2005, bringing non-tradable shares into the stock market. 
However, the total shares remained unchanged, which indicates the shares of 
non-tradable shareholders fell after the reform, reducing the proportion of 
state-owned shares.  The market for A-shares becomes more buoyant with all 
tradable shares, marking a successful ending of the reform of non-tradable 
shares. The effectiveness of the stock market gradually increased after the 
reform of non-tradable shares, not only solving the problems of the market 
illiquidity itself, but also improving corporate governance, as this prevented 
majority shareholders abusing their rights under the dominance structure, and 
balancing the benefits between non-tradable shareholders and tradable 
shareholders. 
 
 
4 - Data 
 
4.1 – Listed companies 
 
The financial data of listed companies between 2007 and 2012 in the 
stock markets of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges were collected 
from the CSMAR. In order to ensure the quality of the data, the following 
filtering principles were applied: 
 
- Companies that were publicly listed before January 01, 2007 were 
selected as original samples, 
because of explanatory variables’ calculation. 
- To guarantee the comparability of data, listed firms that have issued B 
shares or H shares were omitted. 
- Listed companies that had received special treatment, or particular 
transfers which indicated losses appearing for over two years, were also 
omitted. 
- Financial institutions were omitted due to their particularity of asset 
structure. 
- Listed firms with incomplete data or data exception, such as leverage> 
1 or <0;  tangibility>1; tax rate>1  or < -1; non-debt tax shield>1, etc. were 
also omitted. 
- Listed firms in those industries with less than 5 companies were 
omitted. 
Finally, a valid sample of 558 listed companies was obtained, consisting 
of companies from 12 industries. 
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4.2 – Explanatory variables 
 
Based on the discussion above about the determinants of capital 
structure, these indicators are selected as explanatory variables, following 
these principles: (i) They refer to many previous studies into the determinants 
of capital structure; (ii) reflect the value of listed companies; and (iii) 
consider the quantification of indicators and the feasibility of data 
acquisition. Although all the previously mentioned studies deal with the same 
subject, i.e. capital structure, different studies use different definitions of 
capital structure.   As regards empirical studies, Bradley et al (1984) added up 
the book value of long-term liabilities over 20 years from 1962 to 1981, 
divided by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity to obtain the 
ratio of debt to value. Titman and Wessels (1988) used short-term, long-term 
and convertible bonds divided by the market value and the book value of 
equity as a measure for capital structure. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) used several of the following leverage 
ratios to describe capital structure: (1) Non-equity debt to total assets ratio:  
that is, the sum of all liabilities divided by the value of the assets; (2) Ratio of 
debt to total assets: short-term and long-term debts divided by the total assets; 
(3) debt to equity ratio:  the book value of debt divided by the net assets; (4) 
debt to capital ratio:  the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of 
the long-term debt and book value of the equity. They also used the ratio of 
adjusted debt to the sum of adjusted debt and book value of equity as the 
indicator of capital structure.  The definitions of leverage and most 
measurements of appropriate indicators depend on the object of analysis. As 
in the case of Chen (2004), two indicators are selected to measure a 
company’s capital structure in this study, which are the total debt ratio and 
long-term debt ratio.  The total debt ratio is equal to the total debt / total 
assets; the long-term debt is equal to long-term debt/ total assets. 
Therefore, based on the literature review, the following variables 
have been selected as explanatory variables of capital structure in the 
empirical model, in tandem with theories of capital structure and the results 
of previous research, as well as taking into China-specific factors. Table 2 
shows the summary of the key variables, their measures and the predicted 
relation with capital structure used in the study. 
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Table 2 
 
  Dependent Variables Measurement Prediction 
  Total Debt ratio (TD) Total debt / Total assets N/A 
  Long-term Debt ratio (LTD) Long-term debt / Total assets N/A 
  Profitability (PROF) Net Profit / Total assets - 
  Size (SIZE) ln(Total assets) + 
  Growth opportunity (GROWTH) (Final TA - Initial TA) / Initial TA + 
Asset Tangibility (TANG) (Fixed assets + Inventory) / TA + 
Structure Liquidity (LIQ) Current assets / Current liabilities - 
  
Non-debt tax shield effects 
(NDTS) Depreciation / Total assets - 
Ownership Tradable shares % (TSHARES) Negotiable shares / Total shares ? 
Structure Top ten shareholders % (TOP10) 
Percentage of top 10 shareholders' 
shareholding ? 
  Income Tax rate (TAX) Income tax / Income before tax + 
  Uniqueness (UNI) Selling expenses / Operating Income - 
Control 
variable Industry (Di) 
When sample company belongs to i-th 
industry N/A 
 
Notes. Table 2 provides the definition of variables with a prediction. + 
indicates that the changes of variable and debt ratio are in the same direction; - 
indicates that the changes of variable and debt ratio are on the contrary 
changes; N/A indicates that in the predictions of changes in the relation 
between the variable and debt ratio may either be in the same direction or the 
reverse; and, ? indicates that there is no clear conclusion in empirical research. 
 
4.2.1 - Profitability 
 
Based on the Pecking Order theory and Agency Cost theory, it can be 
taken that profitability is negatively related to capital structure.  In this study, 
ROA (net profit to total asset) is employed to measure a company’s 
profitability. 
 
4.2.2.1 - Size 
 
Most previous studies found that there is positive correlation between 
size and debt ratio, including Booth et al.  (2001), Huang and Song (2006) 
and Degryse et al. (2012) among others. In the context of Chinese national 
conditions, corporate borrowing is mainly dominated by bank loans, with 
banks tending to favor larger companies. These companies can obtain credit 
more easily with the help of the government. Therefore, the company size is 
positively related to capital structure. This paper uses the natural logarithm of 
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total assets to measure a company’s size. 
 
4.2.1.2 – Growth opportunity 
 
Companies that belong to an emerging industry generally have a 
higher business risk and bankruptcy risk; hence, they may usually give 
preference to equity financing. Hence, there is a negative correlation between 
growth opportunity and debt ratio. The total assets growth rate is used in this 
paper to measure growth opportunity. 
 
4.2.1.3 - Tangibility 
 
Tangible assets can be considered as collateral. Thus, the greater the 
proportion of tangible assets, the stronger the company’s credit; it is easier to 
increase debt ratio. As shown in previous studies, there is positive correlation 
between tangibility and debt ratio.   The sum of tangible assets and inventory 
divided by total assets is used to measure tangibility. 
 
4.2.1.4 - Liquidity 
 
Some scholars argued that, with high liquid assets, companies often 
prefer to use these assets for internal financing, which indicates that liquidity 
is negative to debt ratio.  The current ratio (current assets/ current liabilities) 
is selected to measure this variable. 
 
4.2.1.5 – Non-debt tax shield 
 
This paper uses the accumulated depreciation to the total assets ratio 
to measure the non-debt tax shield; based on theoretical analysis, it predicts 
that the non-debt tax shield is negative to the debt ratio. 
 
4.2.1.6 – Ownership structure 
 
When studying the effects of ownership structure on capital structure, 
the usual indicators include internal shareholding proportion and institutional 
investors holding and equity dispersion.  Nevertheless, taking into account 
the characteristics of China’s characteristic ownership structure, this study 
uses the proportion of tradable shares and the top ten major shareholders 
holding to specify the company’s ownership structure in this paper. 
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4.2.1.7 - Tax 
 
This paper considers the effect of income tax on the capital structure 
of the company, selecting the indicator of income tax divided by profit before 
tax to measure the average tax rate of the company. 
 
4.2.1.8 - Uniqueness 
 
Because Chinese companies’ financial statements do not specify 
R&D costs, selling expense accounting for operating income will be 
employed for the variable of uniqueness in this paper. In studies on capital 
structure, most scholars have concluded that the uniqueness of the product is 
negative to the debt ratio. 
 
4.2.1.9 – Industry effect 
 
To test the role of industry in capital structure, the industry factor is 
introduced as a control variable. Dummy variables Di are created to represent 
the company’s industry. When the sample company belongs to i -th industry, 
Hi 1, otherwiseH i  0 . It is predicted that the industry factor is 
significant to capital structure in this paper. The 558 companies investigated 
in this study come from 11 industries as Table 3 shows.  In order to prevent 
the collinearity of dummy variables themselves, this paper selected 11 
industry dummy variables, omitting manufacturing industry.  As the sample 
data for manufacturing industry accounts for over 50% of the total sample 
data, it is a method to prevent the collinearitiy of dummy variables, but may 
also reduce the impact of the large sample data on the results. 
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Table 3 
 
Dummy Industry Companies 
D1 Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry & fishery 8 
D2 Mining 21 
D3 Electric power, heat, gas & water production/supply 25 
D4 Constructions 15 
D5 Wholesale & retail 66 
D6 Transport, storage & postal services 18 
D7 Information transmission, software & technology services 16 
D8 Real estate 61 
D9 Leasing & commercial services 5 
D10 Water, environment & public facility management 6 
D11 Diversified industries 11 
  Total 252 
 
Notes. Table 3 reports the classifications of industries (dummy variables). 
 
4.3 – Descriptive analysis of variables 
 
This subsection analyzes the descriptive statistics and correlations of variables. 
Table 4 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
St. 
Deviation 
TD 3,348 0.0071 0.9731 0.5116 0.1749 
LTD 3,348 0.0001 0.6129 0.1017 0.1046 
PROF 3,348 2.70E-04 0.3999 0.0533 0.0439 
SIZE 3,348 18.83 26.97 22.13 1.11 
GROWTH 3,348 -0.5096 7.61 0.1904 0.3237 
TANG LIQ 3,348 0.0052 1.00 0.4513 0.1774 
NDTS 3,348 0.0385 204.74 1.70 4.03 
TSHARES 3,348 -0.0192 0.1498 0.0219 0.0171 
TOP10 3,348 0.1074 1.00 0.7776 0.2335 
TAX 3,348 0.1119 0.9104 0.5291 0.1491 
UNI 3,348 -0.8603 0.9482 0.2052 0.1333 
VALID N 3,348 1.00E-05 0.4805 0.0586 0.067 
Notes. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. 
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The average debt ratio of the Chinese listed companies between 2007 
and 2012 is 51.16%, excluding financial industries. In addition, the range of 
maximum and minimum is 96.60%, which shows the great difference in the 
companies’ leverage. This shows a big difference in the variables of different 
companies over these 6 years. However, as the above table illustrates, the 
mean value of the long-term debt ratio is only 10.172%, indicating that 
China’s listed companies’ average short-term debt ratio is about 40%, which 
is much higher than the long-term debt ratio. 
 
Table 5 
 
Year Total debt ratio Long-term debt ratio 
2007 50.05% 8.04% 
2008 49.86% 8.25% 
2009 50.57% 10.56% 
2010 51.38% 11.11% 
2011 52.29% 11.12% 
2012 52.80% 11.95% 
Total 51.16% 10.17% 
 
Notes. Table 5 presents the mean value of the Total debt ratio and Long-term 
debt ratio. 
 
 
Table 5 shows the average overall debt ratios and the long-term debt 
ratios over 6 years. Besides a slight fall in 2008, the overall debt ratio 
continued to rise from 2007 to 2012, while the long-term debt ratio 
maintained a steady increase over 6 years, although it rarely accounted for the 
overall debt ratio. 
 
 
5 - Methodology 
 
In this section, we present the methodology to study the determinants 
of Chinese listed companies’ capital structures.   In previous studies, there 
have been three approaches employed to conduct the study of the 
determinants of capital structure: (i) regression analysis for studying the 
determinants of capital structure by using leverage to conduct empirical 
regression analysis (Bradley et al., 1984, Rajan and Zingales, 1995, and 
Wald, 1999); (ii) the Logit or Probit model employed to analyze whether the 
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company chooses debt or equity financing in decision-making (Marsh, 1982, 
and Titman, 2002); and (iii) Factor Analysis. 
Regression analysis is used in this paper mainly with the help of panel 
data to build an econometric approach to study the effects of the industry 
factor and the firm factors on companies’ capital structure: 
 
yi,taibixi,tcidi,tui,t      (1) 
 
where i  is the company (between 1 and 558), t  is the time dimension, yi,t  
denotes leverage or long-term leverage, xi,t  is a 1*k vector of explanatory 
variables for the i –th in the t –th period; bi,t  is a k*1 vector of parameters 
while k is the number of explanatory variables, ai  denotes the constant 
coefficient, di,t  stands for industry dummy variables (d1  to d12 ); ci  is the 
coefficient of each dummy variable; yi,t  is random error. 
There are three models that can be employed for the panel data 
regression approach: Fixed Effects model, Random Effects model and 
Pooled-OLS model. The results of these three models are different (see 
Appendix). The first step towards building a Panel data model is to test in 
which model the sample data is consistent with, avoiding the error of model 
setting and improving the validity of the parameter estimation. Identification 
of the Fixed Effects model and the Pooled model can be done by building an 
F-test.  The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test judges the 
significance of individual effects to discriminate between the Random Effects 
or Pooled OLS model. The Hausman test with the Random Effects model as 
an original assumption can be used to identify the choice of the Fixed Effects 
model or the Random Effects model.  The difference between the Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects model primarily reflects dealing with the 
‘individual effect’.  The individual effect of the Fixed Effects model assumes 
that  each individual has a specific intercept, while the Random Effects model 
assumes that every individual has the same intercept, and individual 
differences mainly reflect random interference. Because the Random Effects 
model sets the individual effect as a part of a distractor, it assumes there is no 
relevance between explanatory variables and individual effects, but the Fixed 
Effects model does not require this assumption. The following table (Table 6) 
shows results of 3 tests identifying a model towards determinants of overall 
debt ratio and long-term debt ratio. 
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Table 6 
 
Panel A. Test of panel data model of overall debt ratio 
Null hypothesis (H0) Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Random Effects 
Alternative hypothesis (H1) Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Test F(557,278)=17.64 X^2(01)=3,937.41 X^2(10)=219.15 
  Prob>F=0 Prob>X^2=0 Prob>X^2=0 
Results H0 rejected H0 rejected H0 rejected 
        
Panel B. Test of panel data model of long-term debt ratio 
Null hypothesis (H0) Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Random Effects 
Alternative hypothesis (H1) Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Test F(557,278)=10.75 X^2(01)=3,026.92 X^2(10)=96.98 
  Prob>F=0 Prob>X^2=0 Prob>X^2=0 
Results H0 rejected H0 rejected H0 rejected 
 
Notes. Table 6 reveals the evidence of the test of the panel data models of the 
Total debt ratio (panel A) and the Long-term debt ratio (panel B). 
 
 
As table 6 shows, both results of the F test reject the original 
assumption, and the B-P  tests reject the pooled model. The results of the 
Hausman test reject the Random Effects model. After these three tests, the 
Fixed Effects model should be employed to both overall debt ratio and long-
term debt ratio. 
 
 
6  – Empirical Findings 
 
In this section, the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) method is 
employed to estimate the Fixed Effects model of the overall debt ratio and 
long-term debt ratio. The regression results of both the Fixed Effects model 
of the overall debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio suggest that, apart from 
liquidity and ownership structure, the coefficients of profitability, size, 
growth opportunity, tangibility, tax rate and the uniqueness of product are 
significant to the overall debt ratio.  The coefficients of profitability, size, 
growth opportunity, tangibility, ownership structure and uniqueness of 
product are significant to the long-term debt ratio. 
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Table 7 
 
Explanatory Total debt ratio Long-term debt ratio 
Variables Coeff. N.W. S.E. t-test Coeff. N.W. S.E. t-test 
PROF  -1.19*** 0.0540 -22.16  -0.3410*** 0.0370 -9.21 
SIZE 0.0517*** 0.0021 24.29 0.0262*** 0.0015 17.94 
GROWTH 0.0293*** 0.0070 4.21 0.0285*** 0.0048 5.97 
TANG 0.2270*** 0.0147 15.42 0.0676*** 0.0101 6.70 
LIQ NDTS  -0.0068*** 5.00E-03 -12.60 2.00E-04 4.00E-04 0.5900 
TSHARES  -1.75*** 0.1603 -10.94 0.0121 0.1098 0.1100 
TOP10 3.00E-04 0.0106 0.0324 0.0308*** 0.0073 4.25 
TAX 0.0520** 0.0171 3.04 0.0461*** 0.0117 3.93 
UNI 0.1100*** 0.0177 6.23 -0.0098 0.0121 -0.8100 
D1  -0.2180* 0.0354 -6.16  -0.0764** 0.0243 -3.15 
D2  -0.0585** 0.0184 -3.17  -0.0257* 0.0126 -2.04 
D3 -0.0031 0.0123 -0.2489 0.0383*** 0.0084 4.54 
D4  -0.0545*** 0.0108 -5.03 0.1260*** 0.0074 16.93 
D5 0.1390*** 0.0139 9.99 0.0029 0.0095 0.3100 
D6 0.0588*** 0.0073 8.08 -0.0066 0.0050 -1.32 
D7  -0.0956*** 0.0125 -7.63 0.0229** 0.0086 2.67 
D8  -0.0267* 0.0134 -2.00 0.0044 0.0092 0.4800 
D9 -0.0051 0.0086 -0.5900 0.0699*** 0.0059 11.84 
D10 0.0234 0.0230 1.02 0.0249 0.0158 1.58 
D11 -0.0921 0.0211 -4.37 0.0377** 0.0144 2.61 
  0.0211 0.0158 1.39 0.0604*** 0.0108 5.58 
No. of obs. 3,348 3,348 
R^2 0.4984 0.3414 
F-statistic 157.35 82.11 
Prob>F 0 0 
RMSE 0.1243 0.0852 
 
Notes. Table 7 reports the coefficient, their Newey Standard errors, and t-
values. Moreover, it is mentionedthe number of observations, R2 , F- statistic, 
Probability> F, and Root MSE. *, ** and  *** denotes significance in 10%, 
5% and  1% significance level, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent ( Newey-West) standard errors are  employed. 
 
 
Dimitrios I. Vortelinos, Geeta Lakshmi, Lin Ya –  Gearing of Chinese Listed Companies – 
Frontiers in Finance and Economics – Vol 12 N°2, 57-97 
 
81 
 
After further verifying the significant relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variables, there is clear-cut empirical 
evidence. Profitability, liquidity, non-debt tax shield and uniqueness of 
product are significantly negative to debt. Size, growth opportunity, 
tangibility as well as ownership structure and concentration are significantly 
positive to debt. There is a significantly negative relationship between the 
non-debt tax shield and overall debt.   A positive relationship exists between 
ownership structure and long-term debt, while the top ten shareholders 
holding factor is significantly positive to the overall debt ratio. Moreover, a 
positive relationship exists between the tax rate and overall debt. 
 
Table 8 
 
  Variables Measurement 
Empirical 
results Prediction 
Previous 
studies 
  Profitability (PROF) Total debt / Total assets - - - 
  Size (SIZE) Long-term debt / Total assets + +  + / - 
  Growth opportunity (GROWTH) Net profits / Total assets + +  + / - 
Asset Tangibility (TANG) ln(Total assets) + + + 
Structure Liquidity (LIQ) (Final TA - Initial TA) / Initial TA - -   
  
Non-debt tax shield effects 
(NDTS) (Fixed assets + Inventory) / TA - -   
Ownership Tradable shares % (TSHARES) Current assets / Current liabilities + ? - 
Structure 
Top ten shareholders % 
(TOP10) Depreciation / Total assets + ?   
  Income tax rate (TAX) Negotiable shares / Total shares + +   
  Uniqueness (UNI) 
Percentage of top 10 shareholders' 
shareholding - - - 
Control 
variable Industry (Di) Income tax / Income before tax Sign. N/A   
    Selling expenses / Opening Income       
    Sample company belongs to i-th industry       
 
Notes. Table 8 compares the present paper’s empirical results with predictions 
and results of previous empirical studies. +  indicates that the changes of 
variable and debt ratio are in the same direction; - indicates that the changes 
of variable and debt ratio are on the contrary changes; +/- indicates that in the 
predictions of changes in the relation between the variable and debt ratio may 
either be in the same direction or the reverse; N/A indicates no previous 
empirical evidence; and, ? indicates that there is no clear conclusion in 
empirical research. 
 
 
Overall, the empirical results for Chinese listed companies are in 
essence consistent with the empirical findings of literature on developed 
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countries’ listed companies, with some differences though. This section also 
discusses each explanatory variable’s impact on Chinese listed companies’ 
capital structure, based on empirical results. 
 
6.1 -  Profitability 
 
There always has been a great deal of controversy over the impact of 
profitability on capital structure, with theoretical and empirical views 
reaching no consensus. The empirical results of this research support the 
Pecking Order theory, in which profitability has a significant negative 
correlation with the debt ratio. The higher the profitability of a company, the 
more the retained earnings are to meet the company’s demand, which reduces 
the demand for debt financing. Conversely, when the company’s profitability 
is poor, external financing will increase the debt ratios.   In addition, as 
China’s capital market has its own specific characteristics, profitable 
companies can meet the conditions of the rights issue, which means it is 
relatively cheaper to get funds by equity financing. Higher profitability shows 
better business performance. Compared to other companies, it is easier to 
obtain approval to raise equity capital in the stock market.  Furthermore, due 
to the Chinese stock market’s imperfect development, a higher profitability of 
a company, indicating lower operating risk, will attract the attention of 
investors with regards to its equity investments. Thus, it is easier for 
profitable companies to raise money from the stock market.  This means 
profitable companies finance either through retained earnings or equity 
financing, which is ‘cheap’ and relatively easy to access, but seldom via debt 
financing. Thus, companies’ debt ratios will be accordingly lower 
 
6.2 - Size 
 
The effect of a company’s size on capital structure is still open to 
debate. This study has found there is a significantly positive correlation 
between size and capital structure. This is consistent with the Agency Cost 
theory and many empirical studies (Booth et al., 2001).   The result of this 
correlation between long-term debt and size is also consistent with the study 
of Degryse et al. (2012) that a company’s size plays a signal role on capital 
structure is indicative of its strength and credibility.  A larger company tends 
to expose more information to outside investors than a smaller one (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). As a larger company has asymmetric information, its 
bankruptcy risk is smaller and its credibility is higher, which means it has a 
strong capacity for debt financing. Furthermore, given the economics of scale, 
a larger company will try to continually reduce operating costs so as to bring 
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greater benefits. Furthermore, a larger company is more likely to have the 
capability to diversify, which disperses business risks effectively and 
improves the stability of the company’s development. This in turn decreases 
the probability of bankruptcy, and the company is capable of taking on more 
debt in order to obtain greater financial leverage benefits. 
 
6.3 – Growth opportunity 
 
Our results are consistent with the study of Bhaduri (2002), Huang 
and Song (2005), Noulas and Gen- imakis (2011) and Bayrakdaroğlu et al.  
(2013), that there is a significant positive correlation between growth 
opportunity and the debt ratio. Based on Signaling theory, companies with 
more growth oppor- tunities tend to use more debt financing, while delivering 
information of companies with more growth opportunities and higher 
expected returns to outside investors, tend to raise more funds for companies 
and decrease the probability of bankruptcy.  Moreover, based on the Pecking 
Order theory, when the company is growing, the increase in the operating 
income and the expansion of assets require substantial funding support. 
However, the speed of investment at this period is higher than the increase of 
profit. Thus, simply financing with internal earning returns is insufficient. The 
company will choose external financing in order to grow steadily. In addition, 
the conditions of listed companies allocating and issuing new shares are time 
costing and strict gradually. In order not to miss out on a good investment 
oppor- tunity, growing companies tend to be financed with fast long or short-
term loans. As growing companies have good investment value, it is easy for 
them to attract investors in order to borrow money. 
 
6.4 – Assets structure 
 
6.4.1 - Tangibility 
 
This empirical study shows that tangibility is significantly positive to 
capital structure.  It is prin- cipally based on the value of collateralizable 
assets.  Given the special nature of intangible assets, the company will lose 
them once they have declared bankruptcy. Because they can provide more 
collateral, it is easier for companies with higher tangible assets to obtain 
loans from banks, especially long-term loans. The Agency theory as proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that, after obtaining debt financing, the 
company has an impetus to turn to riskier investments, and the owner has the 
urge to steer wealth from debtors to shareholders by using equity rights. If the 
collateral value of a company’s assets is high, the agency costs that debtors 
Dimitrios I. Vortelinos, Geeta Lakshmi, Lin Ya –  Gearing of Chinese Listed Companies – 
Frontiers in Finance and Economics – Vol 12 N°2, 57-97 
 
84 
 
suffer will fall.  Thus, the more tangibility the company holds, the more 
likely it is to use debt financing. In addition, the collateral value of assets can 
effectively reduce debtors’ losses after bankruptcy. This is consistent with the 
findings of Marsh (1982) and Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Wald (1999), Chen (2004) and Huang and Song (2006). 
 
6.4.2 - Liquidity 
 
The results of this empirical study show that liquidity is not 
significant to long-term debt ratio, but that there is a significant and negative 
correlation between liquidity and overall debt, which is consistent with the 
Pecking Order theory. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that only when 
profitability is good and the company has sufficient funds to invest in current 
positive net value projects, will managers choose to repay debt to accumulate 
liquidity. Thus, the company’s capital structure will be lower when it holds 
more liquidity. A company with high liquidity prefers to use these assets for 
internal financing, which demonstrates the negative correlation between 
liquidity and the debt ratio (Prowse, 1990).   What is more, as the majority of 
debt financing consists of short-term debts in China, the capability to repay 
short-term debt decides the capability to repay all the debts of a listed 
company. The ability to make short-term debts repayment for companies with 
higher liquidity is superior to that of companies with lower liquidity, which 
indicates that the higher its liquidity, the more the company is capable of 
repaying all its debts and lowering the debt ratio. This empirical study shows 
that liquidity is positive to long-term debt, but its coefficient is 0.000218, so 
small that it can be ignored. 
 
6.5 – Non-debt tax shield 
 
Drawing on the experience of previous studies (Wald, 1999), this 
study adds the non-debt tax shield to the model. The results here are 
consistent with others in that there is a significantly negative correlation 
between non-debt tax shields and the overall debt ratio.  The above table 
shows the corresponding t- statistic of the non-debt tax shields of the overall 
debt ratio is -10.94, which indicates this variable has a great impact on 
Chinese listed companies’ capital structure.  Although no detailed explanation 
for this exists in the theoretical field, this could be interpreted as being 
connected with the motive for holding debt financing, which includes 
obtaining interest from financial leverage, reducing agency costs, addressing 
capital shortage, maintaining control, deducting capital cost and monitoring 
managers etc. Sometimes companies will carry out more debt financing to 
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obtain more benefits of financial leverage. Nevertheless, when companies’ 
non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation and investment tax credits, are high, 
the motive for reducing the tax burden with high debt will be reduced, 
decreasing the capital structure.  The empirical result that a non-debt tax 
shield is significantly negative to the debt ratio is consistent with the findings 
of Wald (1999) and those of the study of China’s listed companies by Huang 
and Song (2006). 
 
6.6 – Ownership structure and concentration 
 
The present paper analyzes the ownership structure regarding 
ownership concentration and proportion of tradable shares. Based on the 
empirical results, both the factors of tradable shares and the top ten 
shareholders’ holding are significantly and positively affect the long-term 
debt ratio; but, only the top ten shareholders’ holding significantly and 
positively relates to the overall debt ratio. In addition, their coefficients are 
low, which indicates that the influence of ownership structure on the capital 
structure is not obvious. The ownership structure is the key to company 
governance. Previously, most Chinese listed companies were reorganized 
from state-owned companies, whose state shares had absolute predominance, 
and furthermore governmental intervention influenced their financing. In 
China, total equity includes non-tradable shares and tradable shares, with 
non-tradable shares consisting of state-owned shares and legal person shares.  
Before the reform in non-tradable shares, non-tradable shares accounted for 
over 
2/3 of total equity; among many listed companies, the state was majority 
shareholder. This distortion significantly restricted the function of listed 
companies in the capital market.  However, following the reform in non-
tradable shares in 2007, the structure has gradually been subverted. As the 
table below shows, the percentage of tradable shares has increased yearly 
since 2007, reaching a peak of 92.68% in 
2012. With the increase in a company’s tradable shares, 
its debt ratios have risen. 
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Table 9 
 
Year Tradable shares % TOP 10% 
2007 55.98% 55.37% 
2008 63.60% 54.27% 
2009 79.51% 53.22% 
2010 84.76% 52.15% 
2011 90.00% 51.43% 
2012 92.68% 50.99% 
Total 77.76% 52.91% 
 
Notes. Table 9 reports the mean value of tradable shares and TOP 10 
shareholders holding as percentages. 
 
 
Major shareholders of companies basically hold rights in terms of 
decision-making. With an increase of major shareholders’ ownership, their 
profits will increase. Equity financing will result in the dilution of major 
shareholders’ control, damaging their interests. Meanwhile, debt is a good 
governance mechanism to control agency cost. Therefore, as major 
shareholders’ ownership increases, debt ratios are more likely to rise. This 
empirical result supports the Agency theory. Based on the arrangement of 
"majority rule", 
major shareholders may use their own equity in a holding position to obtain 
directly or indirectly the effective control of a company, while other 
shareholders can only accept the agent relationship that major shareholders 
exercise effective control over the company. The study of Berger et al. (1997) 
reached the same conclusion that Chinese companies’ governance systems 
tend to be based on internalization. 
 
6.7 – Tax 
 
The empirical results show that there is significantly positive relation 
between the tax rate and overall debt, but there is no significance between it 
and long-term debt.  Generally, this is the result of the tax deductibility effect.  
As interest from debt can be deducted before paying income tax, it provides a 
tax subsidy. Therefore, a company with a high income tax rate may use more 
debt to obtain more tax deductions. According to Chinese tax law, different 
tax incentives and treatments of tax relief for different companies vary across 
industries and areas. Additionally, industries are in different development 
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periods, and the previous year’s profit and loss accounts of companies are not 
the same.  In addition, the tax system in China is imperfect. All of these 
factors make for great differences in the actual tax burden of each company, 
which are thereby not comparable. The results of this paper are consistent 
with those of Gordon and Lee (2001), Eldomiaty (2007) and Zare et al. 
(2013), who found that the tax rate is significantly positive to the debt ratio. 
 
6.8 - Uniqueness 
 
The empirical results show that uniqueness is significantly negative to 
the capital structure, which is consistent with in the findings of previous 
studies of developed countries’ listed companies.  Specific assets cannot 
easily be transferred and disposed of, leading to the creditors’ security role 
being very small.  Thus, debt financing will suppress corporate investment in 
specific assets, which indicates it will be more convenient for a company to 
invest in specific assets via equity financing. Then, the high asset specificity 
will result in lower debt financing capacity.   Moreover, the higher the degree 
of the asset specificity, the more the investors’ asset investing into specific 
assets, which will pointedly increase the investors’ risk.  Investors will be 
reluctant to purchase stocks with a higher proportion of specific assets 
because of the increased risk without a corresponding increase of corporate 
control or negotiating power to settle business disputes, which make the 
companies use more retained earnings to finance, and the debt ratio will be 
reduced.  Particularly in the case of high-tech industry, in the start-up phase, 
high-tech companies mainly prefer to use internal financing. They use equity 
financing, which is more flexible, rather than debt financing, if obtaining 
external financing.  As it continues to expand and it becomes increasingly 
easy to obtain a stable cash flow, the company will use debt financing more 
actively.  Therefore, it is remarkable if the company obtains some preferential 
policies which help to increase profitability in the start-up phase. 
 
6.9 – Industry effect 
 
The average debt ratios of listed companies are quite different across 
industries, as indicated in Table 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimitrios I. Vortelinos, Geeta Lakshmi, Lin Ya –  Gearing of Chinese Listed Companies – 
Frontiers in Finance and Economics – Vol 12 N°2, 57-97 
 
88 
 
Table 10 
 
  N Total debt ratio Long-term debt ratio 
    Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
D1 48 0.4079 0.2000 0.6300 0.0455 0.0014 0.3000 
D2 126 0.4777 0.1000 0.8100 0.1316 0.0070 0.4200 
D3 150 0.5110 0.0300 0.8600 0.2373 0.0015 0.6100 
D4 90 0.7229 0.4000 0.9700 0.1094 3.00E-04 0.5100 
D5 396 0.5678 0.0400 0.9100 0.0689 2.00E-04 0.3600 
D6 108 0.4099 0.0700 0.7900 0.1125 2.00E-04 0.5500 
D7 96 0.3784 0.0900 0.6300 0.0672 4.00E-04 0.3700 
D8 366 0.6207 0.1200 0.9000 0.1854 7.00E-04 0.5000 
D9 30 0.5062 0.2900 0.7100 0.0957 2.00E-04 0.3700 
D10 36 0.4119 0.1800 0.7100 0.1210 0.0051 0.3300 
D11 66 0.5168 0.0300 0.7800 0.1342 4.00E-04 0.4300 
Total 1,512 0.5116 0.0100 0.9700 0.1017 1.00E-04 0.6100 
 
Notes. Table 10 reports descriptive statistics (number of observations, mean, 
minimum and maximum) for the regression coefficients of industry dummy 
variables across Chinese listed companies. Panels A and B concern 
desctptives of industry coefficients for Total debt ratio and Long-term debt 
ratio, accordingly. 
 
 
Apart from the financial industry, the highest mean of debt ratio over 
6 years is in the construction industry (72.29%).  Next comes the real estate 
industry, wholesale and retail industry, diversified industry and the industry 
of electric power, heat, gas, and water production and supply, whose mean 
values of debt ratio are over 50%.  The lowest mean is in the information 
technology industry (37.84%).   This not only shows that the industry factor 
has a certain impact on listed companies’ capital structure, but also indicates 
the phenomenon of the prevailing low level of debt financing of listed 
companies in China. However, the highest mean value of the long-term debt 
ratio is in the industry of electric power, heat, gas, and water production and 
supply, at 23.73%, while the lowest one is agriculture (4.55%). 
Designing industry dummy variables and combining them with an analysis of 
the regression model indicate that the impact of different industries on capital 
structure is significantly different.  From the regression results, the industries 
of electricity, construction, wholesale and retail and transport are significant 
to the overall debt ratio, while the industries of mining, electricity, real estate 
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and diversified industry are significant to the long-term debt ratio. Having 
further corroborated the correlations between the significant industries and the 
dependent variables, it is found that the impact of the construction industry on 
overall debt is greatest in all these industries as regards the coefficients, while 
the impact of the electricity industry on long-term debt is the greatest. From 
the above, debt financing needs in different industries are quite different. For 
example, the industries of wholesale and retail, real estate, construction are 
industries with a fast cash flow, and temporary shortage of funds is a common 
phenomenon, which makes these companies use debt financing.  These 
industries tend to have higher debt ratios, while the industries of information 
technology, agriculture and transportation tend to have lower debt ratios. 
Moreover, the industry factor is significant to the capital structure, but the 
level of influence of different industries on capital structure is different, which 
is mainly due to different competition, operating cycles, operating 
characteristics, culture and national policy priorities of different industries. 
All of these factors cause companies in different industries to have differences 
in debt financing and use of leverage. 
 
 
7 – Concluding remarks and wider issues 
 
7.1 – Concluding remarks 
 
The results of the empirical analysis clearly reflect the current 
situation in the capital market in China via econometric analysis and 
discussion. Firstly, Chinese listed companies’ capital structure does not 
match with the Pecking Order theory, evident in other countries. Compared to 
listed companies in developed countries, the average long-term debt ratio of 
Chinese listed companies is low (Table 5).  In addition, the proportion of 
current liabilities is high, but the long-term liability ratio is low. Furthermore, 
listed companies are increasingly based on external financing (Table 1).  
Chinese listed companies have a great preference for equity financing rather 
than debt financing. Secondly, using the panel data Fixed effects model, it 
was found that firms’ own factors have a significant effect on the gearing1 of 
listed companies. 
The analysed results of the determinants of listed companies’ capital 
structure (Table 7) are as follows: The coefficient of profitability and capital 
structure is negative and highly significant. The stronger the profitability, the 
                                                        
1 Gearing is measured as Total  debt ratio and Long-term debt ratio. 
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lower the gearing is; this is consistent with the results of the majority of 
previous studies. The results show that the proportion of debt financing of a 
large company is greater than that of a small company. This is consistent with 
the literature which states that the company size and capital structure are 
positively correlated. The growth opportunity is positive significant to the 
gearing. This supports the literature which states that debt is available quicker 
when needed to match the demands of growth in comparison to equity which 
may be a slower and more cumbersome process. There is a significantly 
positive correlation between tangibility and gearing.  As hypothesized and 
confirmed by previous literature, the more collaterallised the assets, the easier 
it is for the company to gain access to debt financing, thereby increasing the 
gearing in the capital structure. However, there is no significant relationship 
between liquidity and long-term gearing in the capital structure.  In terms of 
total debt ratio, however, liquidity is negatively related but strongly 
significant, although the size of the coefficient is small. This shows that 
companies using short-term debt are influenced by the reassurance of 
adequate liquidity. Given that Chinese firms use more short term debt than 
long-term debt (as evidenced by the difference in the two debt ratios), this is 
important for Chinese companies to note that if they want to borrow more 
short-term debt, they will need to demonstrate their liquidity. The non-debt 
tax shield is significant and highly negative to overall debt ratio as predicted 
and demonstrated by previous studies, while the ownership structure is 
significant and positive to the long-term debt ratio.  The ownership structure 
is measured by two variables: traded shares as a percent of total shares which 
is significant to long-term debt ratio but not total debt ratio. Also, the percent 
of top 10% shareholders’ holdings which is significant and positively related 
to both debt ratios. Both these are a measure of corporate governance and 
may suggest that debt financing is available easily when there is confidence 
in the market.  The coefficient of the tax rate and the overall debt ratio is 
significant and highly positive as hypothesized by previous literature. The 
uniqueness of the product is negatively significant to both variables, 
suggesting that such firms prefer equity finance. This is again consistent with 
previous literature. 
The study reveals great differences of gearing across the various 
industries of Chinese listed companies through descriptive statistics (Table 
10).  The debt ratios of the industries of electric power, constructions, 
wholesale & retail, real estate, leasing & commercial services and diversified 
industries are high
2
. 
                                                        
2 Debt ratios for any industry are high (low) if the ratio is higher (lower) than 50%. 
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However, the transportation, mining, agriculture, information transmission 
and water concervancy industries demand lower funds compared with other 
industries and other than long-term debt funds can meet their needs. Thus, the 
debt ratios of companies in these industries are lower. The analysis with the 
panel data Regression Model (Table 7), adding the dummy variable, shows 
that the significance and degree of effect of different industries on gearing are 
different. We conclude that not all industries use debt to the same degree to 
grow. However, most of industry dummy variables significantly and 
positively affect both debt ratios.  In specific, total debt ratio is negatively 
affected by agriculture, electric power, wholesale & retail, information 
transmission and water conservancy industries; and positively explained by 
constructions and wholesale & retail. Moreover, long-term debt ratio is 
positively explained by mining, electric power, transportation, real estate, 
water conservancy and diversified industries; and negatively affected only by 
agriculture. 
 
7.2 – Wider issues 
 
Corporate governance is achieved through a series of reasonable 
systems that the company deploys to balance the rights and responsibilities 
between different shareholders. The incentive and restriction mechanisms of 
China’s listed companies do not play a very effective role; the companies will 
still be in pursuit of expansion, ignoring the risks of short-term debt.  Only 
through the company improving its internal governance structure can 
managers work hard for shareholders’ benefits.  They can take the following 
measures: (i) establish and improve an effective system of professional 
managers, (ii) establish and improve the long-term market-based dynamic 
incentive mechanism, (iii) establish an effective internal constraint 
mechanism to ensure managers work for the shareholders’ benefits. 
Additionally, two recommendations for the Chinese government to help 
companies optimize their capital structure are the need to take steps in law 
enforcement efforts and protect the benefits of debt holders through building 
an effective debt paying security system, such as revising the bankruptcy law 
to maintain its operability. The government could optimize the mechanism of 
information disclosure to establish a powerful mechanism of signal 
transmission. This would firstly improve the relevant regulation of 
information disclosure to a standardized information agency such as 
accounting firms, audit evidence, etc.  Secondly, inspired by other countries, 
it should build a complete information system including an information 
disclosure system, a rating system, an examination and verification system 
and a punishment system.According to the theories and the empirical results 
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of the determinants of China listed companies’ capital structure, this study 
notes the following aspectsof  firms’ capital structure: 
There is still a high degree of state ownership and intervention 
although there have been attempts to improve the efficiency of the market 
made in 2007 (Table 1).  This indicates conflicts of interest. The Chinese 
capital market is a nascent stage and plagued by problems of illiquidity, 
corporate governance and agency problems as multiple types of ownership 
(state, tradable, non-tradable) can contribute to agency problems related to 
risk and return exposure (Chen, 2013). 
Assets are financed primarily through retained earnings, equity 
finance or other means
3
. Use of long-term debt is relatively small when 
compared to other countries and there is greater reliance on short-term debt to 
fund needs (Table  5). Normally, short-term debt is expensive and unreliable 
for long-term needs but in the case of China, it may be possible that due to the 
presence of state ownership, access to short-term debt is the norm. This 
finding supports the results of Provy and Maury (2010) who studied the 
capital structure of Russian listed companies in another large emerging market 
with high state ownership. 
Results for all explanatory variables (Table 8) are consistent with 
prior literature. It is interesting that most other studies on capital structure of 
emerging markets have found that profitability, size, tangibility, use of tax 
and non-debt tax shields, liquidity as well as uniquness support the theorized 
relation to capital structure. Thus, they demonstrate that despite culture and 
institutional characteristics, capital markets follow common economic norms. 
Industry characteristics also appear to be important in the choice of 
capital structure, as the type of capital needs type significantly affects the 
choice of capital structure.  When optimizing its capital structure, a company 
should strive for a suitably mature structure of capital and debt, based on a 
consideration of the industry’s characteristics, including the cycle of industry, 
the degree of competition, the management risk and investment 
characteristics, etc. 
                                                        
3 Entrusted  loans and shadow banking seem to start  becoming a major source of finance 
in China  and other emerging countries. 
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